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Abstract
We study how the launching of a do-not-spam registry will aﬀect
the internet’s eﬃciency. We show that as long as the cost of sending
spam messages is not high, having rich users (who have high-quality
ﬁlters) join the registry has the desirable eﬀect of lowering the number
of spam messages sent to each user, while having poor users (who have
low-quality ﬁlters) join the registry has the opposite undesirable eﬀect.
We also show that the registry improves the total eﬃciency of the
internet - as long as the cost of sending spam messages is not high; as
more users join, the total number of spam messages sent to all users
decreases.
1 Introduction
Bulk electronic mail, also known as spam mail, has become a major danger to
the eﬃciency of the internet. Postini reports that spam activity has increased
over 65% since January, 2002, and that roughly 80% of e-mail transporta-
tion is spam. The report states that “this increase causes e-mail systems to
experience unexpected overload in bandwidth, server storage capacity, and
loss of end-user productivity.”
The most popular way to defend oneself from spam mail is to use a ﬁlter,
which is supposed to ﬁlter out spam messages. The eﬀectiveness of this
∗Blue Security Inc., www.bluesecurity.com
†School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel, and
MEDS Department, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheri-
dan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2001. e-mail: eilons@post.tau.ac.il
1method has been discussed in numerous articles, including [1], [2], [3], [4],
[6]. In [13], we showed that unless the cost of sending a spam message is
suﬃciently high, improving ﬁlters has the undesirable eﬀect of increasing the
total number of spam messages spammers send.
Other methods of ﬁghting spam mail that have been discussed in the
literature include (see, e.g., [4], [12]) authentication and reputation services,
counter attacks, channelling (e.g., [7], [8]), payments (e.g. [10], [14]), and
regulatory actions (e.g. [9]).
In the present paper we concentrate on another solution to the spam
problem, namely the do-not-spam registry. In this solution, users who opt
not to receive spam mail join a do-not-spam registry, and spammers should
not mail those users any spam mail.
The American Federal Trade Commission has studied the feasibility of
such a registry, and concluded in June 2004 that “a National Do Not Email
Registry, without a system in place to authenticate the origin of email mes-
sages, would fail to reduce the burden of spam and may even increase the
amount of spam received by consumers.” Nevertheless, attempts at launch-
ing a registry are occasionally made (e.g., the Michigan registry for children
in July 2005).
Whether or not current technology can support an eﬀective registry is a
crucial question for these attempts. However, another important question
that was not asked during the debate on the desirability of a registry is what
will be the eﬀects of the registry on the amount of spam messages received
by users who do not join the registry. That is, suppose there is an eﬀective
do-not-spam registry, and suppose that some portion of the population joins.
Will other users, who do not join the registry, receive more or less spam mes-
sages? Will the total number of spam messages sent by spammers increase
or decrease?1
To answer these questions, we use the model studied in [13]. In that
model, the population is divided to two groups, rich users who use more
eﬀective ﬁlters, and poor users who use less eﬀective ﬁlters.
Our ﬁrst main ﬁnding is that as long as the cost of mailing spam mes-
sages is not high, when poor users join to the registry, the total number of
spam messages sent by spammers increases, whereas when rich users join the
1Even if the number of messages each user receives increases, since there are fewer users
who opt to receive spam mail, the total number of spam messages sent by spammers may
decrease.
2registry, the total number of spam messages sent by spammers decreases.
The intuition behind this result is the following. If poor users join the
registry, the percentage of rich users in the population of those who opt to
receive spam messages increases. Therefore, the average quality of ﬁlters
increases as well, and spammers need to send more spam messages to bypass
the ﬁlters.
Our second main ﬁnding concerns the eﬃciency of the internet. We show
that as more poor users join the registry, the total number of spam messages
sent to users decreases, so that having poor users join the registry improves
the internet’s eﬃciency.
When the cost of sending spam messages is low, the eﬀect on the internet’s
eﬃciency of having rich users register is positive as well. Indeed, our ﬁrst
ﬁnding asserts that in this case the number of spam messages sent to each
user decreases, and since the number of users who opt to receive spam mail
decreases as well, the total number of spam messages decreases.
It is worthwhile to compare our ﬁndings with the eﬀect of improving
ﬁlters on the eﬃciency of the internet, as found in [13]. The main ﬁnding
of [13] is that improving the quality of the ﬁlters has an ambiguous eﬀect:
users who use the improved ﬁlter receive less spam messages, but, if the cost
of sending a spam message is not high, the total number of messages sent by
spammers increases, and other users, who keep their old ﬁlters, receive more
spam messages. Thus, whereas improving ﬁlters has the undesirable eﬀect of
harming the internet’s eﬃciency, a registry has the opposite eﬀect.
An important moral question is how to price the use of a registry. Since
the use of a registry may increase the number of spam messages spammers
send, the users who are potentially most harmed by this technology are
poor users. If registering is costly, poor users will not be able to register,
and they will suﬀer from a technology that helps rich users (as is the case
nowadays with ﬁlters). Therefore, the socially responsible solution is to oﬀer
the registry free of charge to poor users. For rich users the registry serves
as an improved substitute to ﬁlters: it completely eliminates the problem of
spam mail, while improving the internet’s eﬃciency.
We end the Introduction by mentioning that our results do not apply
only to a do-not-spam registry. They apply to any technology that ensures
its users do not receive spam messages.
The paper is arranged as follows. In section 2 we present the model of
[13] adapted to the problem we study here, and we recall the results we need
from [13]. In section 3 we describe our main results. The proofs appear in
3section 4.
2 The Model
The population consists of M1 +M2 users and N spammers. Each spammer
sends spam messages to the users. We assume that the spammers do not
distinguish between users, so that each spammer sends the same number of
messages to every user. However, spammers are not identical, so that each
spammer may send a diﬀerent number of messages.
The users are partitioned into two groups: there are M1 poor users and
M2 rich users. There are two ways, two technologies, to ﬁght spam mail:
ﬁlters and a registry. We assume that all users have a spam ﬁlter. However,
rich users have better ﬁlters than poor users. We measure the quality of
a ﬁlter by the percentage of spam messages it allows to pass through. We
denote by q and r the quality of the ﬁlter of poor and rich users respectively.
Since rich users have better ﬁlters,
r < q. (1)
We denote by s the percentage of users who purchase spam products.
Those users are called potential buyers. We assume that those users are
evenly distributed among poor and rich users.
For simplicity, we assume that each potential buyer makes at most one
purchase of spam products every year. Moreover, we assume that a potential
buyer who did not yet purchase a spam product this year, upon receiving a
spam message has a probability p of deleting it, and a probability 1 − p of
purchasing the spam product that is advertised in that message. We assume
that the proﬁt the spammer makes from each purchase is T dollars. Finally,
we assume that users do not distinguish between spammers, so that if a
potential buyer decides to purchase a spam product, the probability he will
purchase a product from any speciﬁc spammer is equal to the proportion of
spam messages that the spammer mailed to the user out of all spam messages
the user received.
Spammers have two types of cost - a ﬁxed cost and a per-message cost.
The spammer’s ﬁxed cost is denoted by D dollars per year. The cost of each
message is denoted by d dollars per message.
The goal of each spammer is to maximize his or her expected gain.
42.1 Spammers’ Payoﬀ
We now analyze the decision problem of a speciﬁc spammer. To this end, we
calculate the spammer’s expected gain.
Denote by x the number of messages per user per year that a speciﬁc
spammer, say Spade, sends, and by y the total number of spam messages per
user per year sent by all other spammers.
















Indeed, Spade’s total cost is D + x(M1 + M2)d. Each rich buyer receives
r(x + y) messages, so the probability he or she purchases a spam product
is 1 − pr(x+y). Similarly, the probability that a potential poor buyer pur-
chases a product is 1 − pq(x+y). Since there are M1 poor users and M2
rich users, and since potential buyers are evenly distributed among users,









. Since the proﬁt from each purchase
is T dollars, and since x
x+y of the purchases are made from Spade, the third
term in (2) measures Spade’s total gain.
If W(x,y) < 0, Spade has a negative payoﬀ, and will go out of the market.
Otherwise, Spade makes a proﬁt.
For the mathematical analysis, it is more convenient to assume that the
number of spam messages the spammer sends to each user is a non-negative
real number, rather than a non-negative integer.
2.2 Stable conﬁgurations
A vector ~ x = (x1,...,xN), which indicates the number of spam messages
each spammer sends, is termed a spam conﬁguration.
Deﬁnition 1 A spam conﬁguration is a vector ~ x = (x1,...,xN), where xi is
the number of spam messages per user per year sent by spammer i, for each
1 ≤ i ≤ N.
A conﬁguration is stable if no spammer has an incentive to deviate from
it.











Since stable conﬁgurations are deﬁned using local conditions (the direc-
tional derivatives are 0), at stable conﬁgurations no spammer can proﬁt from
small changes in the number of messages he or she mails. However, we do
not rule out that the spammer can proﬁt from large changes.
Note, though, that any conﬁguration which is stable for large and small
changes is in particular stable according to Deﬁnition 2.
2.3 Main Results of [13]
In this section we brieﬂy recall some of the results of [13] we shall need here.
The following theorem contains two results. First, if the cost of sending
a spam message is higher than some cut-oﬀ, there will be no spam, as at
least one active spammer must have a loss, and will go out of the market.
Second, if the cost of sending a spam message is below the cut-oﬀ, a stable
conﬁguration exists. Even though in principle there might exist several stable
conﬁgurations, in all those conﬁgurations the total number of messages sent
to users is the same, so that from the point of view of the users all those
stable conﬁgurations are equivalent.
Theorem 3 [13] If
(M1 + M2)d > Ts(−lnp)(M1q + M2r) (3)
in every conﬁguration the payoﬀ of at least one spammer is negative.
If
(M1 + M2)d < Ts(−lnp)(M1q + M2r) (4)
a stable conﬁguration exists. Moreover, in all stable conﬁgurations the total
number of spam messages sent to each use is the same.
The left-hand side in (3) and (4) is the total cost of mailing a single
spam message to all users, whereas the right-hand side in (3) and (4) is the
2Recall that W(x,y) is a function of two variables, so that ∂W
∂x is its derivative relative
to its ﬁrst argument.
6expected gain from the ﬁrst spam message that is sent. Indeed, since p is in
practice close to 1, 1 − p is close to −lnp, so that s(−lnp)(M1q + M2r) is
the expected number of users who purchase a spam product as a result of
the ﬁrst spam message they received.
We denote by z(M1,M2) the total number of spam messages sent to each
user in all stable conﬁgurations. By Theorem 3 this quantity is well deﬁned.
3 Results
Our assumption that the registry is eﬀective implies that each user who joins
the registry stops receiving spam mail. This eﬀectively means that that user
is removed from the population: from the point of view of spammers, that
user does not exist. Therefore, as more poor users join the registry, the
number M1 of poor users who opt to receive spam mail decreases. Similarly,
as more rich users join the registry, the number M2 of rich users who opt to
receive spam mail decreases.
Our ﬁrst result states that if having a rich user join the registry decreases
the number of spam messages spammers send, then having a poor user reg-
ister increases the number of spam messages spammers send. On the other
hand, if having a rich user join the registry increases the number of spam
messages spammers send, then having a poor user join decreases the number
of spam messages spammers send.
Thus, if it is eﬃcient that a rich user joins the registry, then it is ineﬃcient
that a poor user does so, whereas if it is eﬃcient that a poor user joins the








(M1,M2) < 0, ∀M1,M2.
In other words, the eﬀect of rich users registering on the total number of
spam messages sent is always opposite to the analog eﬀect when poor users
join the registry. This result is quite surprising, as it says that there is no
win-win situation: in any given situation, either society as a whole prefers
that a poor user joins the registry, or it prefers that a rich user does so, but
not both.
7The main force behind this result is that the behavior of spammers de-
pends on M1 and M2 only through the ratio
M1
M2. When poor users join the
registry M1 decreases and therefore the ratio decreases as well, whereas when
rich users join M2 decreases and therefore the ratio increases. Thus, the ef-
fect of having rich users join the registry on the ratio is opposite to the eﬀect
of having poor users join, so that the eﬀect on the behavior of spammers is
opposite as well.
It is interesting to note that this result is not particular to the model
we study, but it is valid in any model in which the behavior of spammers
depends on M1 and M2 only through the ratio
M1
M2.
The following theorem states that when the cost of sending spam mail
is not high, having poor users join the registry has a negative eﬀect on the
behavior of spammers: the number of spam messages they send to each non-
registered user increases.





In practice N ≈ 200, d ≈ $0.000002, T ≈ $100 and s ≈ 5%. Substituting
p ≈ 99% yields that the right-hand side is 0.8%. Presently for the best ﬁlters
we have r ≈ 4%, so the condition in Theorem 5 holds. Thus, if these days a
do-not-mail-me registry is launched, and spammers adhere to it, having poor
users join the registry would increase the total number of spam messages sent
by spammers.
Finally, we study the eﬀect of the registry on the eﬃciency of the internet.
We show that as more poor users join the registry, the total number of spam
messages sent by spammers decreases. Thus, to increase eﬃciency one should
encourage users to join the registry. Rich users have a similar eﬀect, provided
the cost of sending spam mail is not too high. This eﬀect is summarized by
the following two theorems.
Theorem 6 The function M1 7→ (M1 + M2) × z(M1,M2) is monotonic in-
creasing: as M1, the number of poor users who do not join the registry,
decreases, the total number of spam messages sent decreases as well.
Theorem 7 Provided N is large, if r > N
N−1
dN
Ts(−lnp) the function M2 7→
(M1 + M2) × z(M1,M2) is monotonic increasing: as M2, the number of rich
users who do not join the registry, decreases, the total number of spam mes-




























The following result is proved in [13] (Lemma 10 and the proof of Theorem
5).
Theorem 8 For every M1, M2 and z, ∂F





Theorem 8 implies that z(M1,M2), the total number of spam messages
sent by spammers, is the unique solution of a certain equation. Since ∂F
∂z
is strictly positive, the implicit function theorem implies that z(M1,M2) is
diﬀerentiable.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. Deﬁne β =
M1
M1+M2; it is the percentage of poor
users in the population. Then 1 − β =
M2
M1+M2. Note that F depends on M1
and M2 only through β. Moreover, increasing M1 while keeping M2 ﬁxed
increases β, and increasing M2 while keeping M1 ﬁxed decreases β.
Since the function z(M1,M2) is diﬀerentiable, if increasing M1 (increas-
ing β) causes z to increase, then increasing M2 (decreasing β) causes z to
decrease, and vice versa. The result follows.
Proof of Theorem 5.
Step 1: ∂z
∂M1(M1,M2) < 0 if and only if ∂F
∂M1(M1,M2,z(M1,M2)) < 0.
Deﬁne G(M1) = F(M1,M2,z(M1,M2)). By Theorem 8 G(M1) = dN
Ts for












By Theorem 8 we have ∂F
∂z (M1,M2,z) < 0, so that
∂z
∂M1
(M1,M2) < 0 ⇔
∂F
∂M1
(M1,M2,z(M1,M2)) < 0. (5)
9Step 2: Conditions for ∂F
∂M1(M1,M2,z(M1,M2)) < 0.




































qz(−lnp) − (N − 1)p
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Setting b q = qz(−lnp)−N +1 and b r = rz(−lnp)−N +1, multiplying both
sides by exp(N − 1), and using the equality p1/(−lnp) = exp(−1) we obtain
∂F
∂M1
(M1,M2,z) < 0 ⇔ b q exp(−b q) < b rexp(b r). (6)
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
Figure 1: The graph of the function xexp(−x)
One can use the Lambert function ([11], [5]) to solve Eq. (6), but the re-
sulting equation involves the parameter z, and therefore we cannot derive an
explicit necessary and suﬃcient condition for the inequality ∂F
∂M1(M1,M2,z) <
0. However, the function xexp(−x) is increasing in the interval (0,1] and
decreasing in the interval [1,∞) (see Figure 1). Since q > r we have b q > b r.
Therefore we have
b r > 1 =⇒
∂F
∂M1
(M1,M2,z) < 0. (7)
By the deﬁnition of b r, a suﬃcient condition for ∂F





10Step 3: A condition for z(M1,M2) > N
(−lnp)r.
Theorem 8 implies that z(M1,M2) > N



































We note that p1/(−lnp) = exp(−1). When N is large3 exp(−N) ≈ 0, so that








Thus, when N is large z(M1,M2) > N
(−lnp)r if and only if N−1
N (−lnp)r > dN
Ts,








We now use the previous steps to conclude the proof. By step 1 ∂z
∂M1(M1,M2) <
0 if and only if ∂F
∂M1(M1,M2,z(M1,M2)) < 0. By Steps 2 and 3 a suﬃcient
condition for ∂F







Ts(−lnp) we also have ∂z
∂M1(M1,M2) < 0, as desired.
Proof of Theorem 6. Denote by Z = (M1+M2)×z the total number





























3In practice N ≈ 200.
11Since the function Z 7→ pcZ is monotonic decreasing for every c > 0, and
since the function Z 7→ (1 − pcZ)/Z is monotonic decreasing for every c > 0
(see Lemma 12 in [13]), we have
∂G
∂Z
(M1,M2,Z) < 0, ∀M1,M2. (9)
Set H(M1) = G(M1,M2,Z(M1,M2)). By Theorem 8 we have H(M1) =
dN












By (9), to prove that ∂Z
∂M1(M1,M2) > 0 we need to show that ∂G
∂M1(M1,M2,Z) >
0.





































Since q > r we have p−cq > p−cr for every c > 0, and therefore the fourth








































12Since 1−px > x(−lnp)px for every x > 0 and every p ∈ (0,1), the diﬀerence
between the ﬁrst term in Eq. (11) and the ﬁfth term in Eq. (10) is positive.
We will now show that the sum of all terms in (10) that contain the parameter
r is non-negative. This will conclude the proof.


























Observe that A(0) = 0 and A(∞) = N−1
Z
M2
M1+M2 > 0. Therefore, to show that
A(r) ≥ 0 for every r ≥ 0 it is suﬃcient to show that A is non-decreasing.











(M1 + M2)2 .
If rZ ≤ 1 then, as soon as N > 3 this expression is positive.4 If rZ ≥ 1
the last term is smaller than the penultimate term, so as soon as N > 2 this
expression is positive.




By Theorem 5 we have ∂z
∂M1(M1,M2) < 0. By Theorem 4 we have ∂z
∂M2(M1,M2) >
0. In other words, the function M2 7→ z(M1,M2) is increasing. Therefore
the function M2 7→ (M1 + M2) × z(M1,M2), as a product of two increasing
functions, is increasing as well.
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